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Abstract  
The review of the CSR literature in this paper revealed certain gaps in available knowledge. Thus, 
there is uncertainty regarding the actual spread of CSR activities; disagreement on the value of business 
case for CSR; and controversy over what drives firms to voluntarily adopt a CSR practice. This situation 
calls on researchers to investigate the actual policies and practices used by managers when addressing 
their companies’ social and environmental responsibilities. This section seeks to develop a theoretical 
framework that will enable this study to empirically scrutinize theory and produce findings that advance 
existing knowledge on the topic. 
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Introduction 
This is achieved based on an inter-disciplinary approach, drawing on the theory of diffusion of 
self-regulation and stakeholder theories. Although these theories may often overlap, they offer a rich 
framework for exploring questions pertaining to the influence of CSR on business practice. 
Complementary to this approach, self-regulation and stakeholder theories sheds light on how firms adopt 
CSR practices nowadays compared to the companies that first adopted such practices. Comparison 
between early and late adopters of CSR practices is important, as research has shown that these two 
groups of adopters may implement business practices differently (Delmas, 2003). These theories offer 
additional insights as they discuss whether firms use CSR practices as symbols of conformance to societal 
demands. In addition, self-regulation and stakeholder theories elucidate knowledge on the significance of 
pressures firms face to adopt CSR practices. 
 
The rationale for choosing an inter-disciplinary approach lies on the fact that a) the nature of CSR 
is interdisciplinary; b) single discipline research has encountered a bottle-neck and more than one 
discipline is needed to make a breakthrough; and c) the use of such an approach will enable the researcher 
to obtain a ‘real world’ insight on the implementation of CSR practices (Tait & Lyall, 2007). This paper 
introduces a set of testable hypotheses, which create a conceptual framework for the empirical analysis 
implemented in the following sections. 
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Self-Regulation Theory 
 
CSR scholars have used self-regulation theory to analyze the conditions necessary for securing 
successful implementation of CSR practices (e.g. Albareda, 2008; Christmann & Taylor, 2006).Some 
authors dispute the potential of CSR self-regulatory tools, such as ICMS, to effectively control for-profit 
organizations (Cragg, 2005). They suggest that companies will not put the collective interest above their 
own and will behave opportunistically when adopting these measures. They further assert that free-riding, 
i.e. non-conformance with the tools’ requirements, is unavoidable (Maitland, 1985). 
 
According to this analysis, companies are not sure if posing stricter rules on their operations will 
mean that they will gain an advantage or a disadvantage towards their competitors. In this context, they 
choose to free-ride and not implement substantially the self-regulatory measures (Lenway & Rehbein, 
1991). 
 
Adherence to various requirements will only succeed when the adoption of a tool includes some 
benefits for the firm. As Kollman and Prakash (2002) argue, CSR measures such as ICMS need to have 
excludable benefits for firms, i.e. benefits that cannot be gained by competitors. Otherwise, companies 
will prefer to serve own interests and not fully comply with the standards’ requirements (Delmas, 2004). 
Firms are interested in differentiating themselves from their competitors and on that basis they decide to 
adopt or withdraw a practice (Lenox & Nash, 2003). Given that companies pursuit increasing own profits, 
it is rational for them to avoid conforming to any requirements if such avoidance is compatible with 
retaining their ICMS certification. Businesses will attempt to minimize obligations stemming from the 
adoption of CSR self-regulatory tools and will only conform to requirements if to refuse would heavily 
influence their survival (Cradden, 2005). 
 
There are other CSR scholars whose views echo those described in the previous paragraphs, but 
who approach the topic from a different angle. Their research focuses on the enforcement and auditing 
mechanisms of ICMS (Biazzo, 2005; Boiral, 2003b; Christmann & Taylor, 2006). They take the view that 
when these are weak, companies may behave opportunistically, meaning with guile to serve own interests 
(Williamson, 1985). A number of issues have been identified provoking the decoupling of the standards’ 
requirements from firms’ everyday operations, including commercial relations between companies and 
auditors and insufficient business knowledge by auditors. There are many examples of auditors’ failures 
in literature. 
 
For instance, O’Rourke (2003) focuses on PricewaterhouseCoopers’ auditing procedures with 
regard to labor standards in Asian countries. He argues that although auditors identified minor violations 
of health and safety norms they failed to note a number of serious issues, including the use of hazardous 
chemicals and wage laws violations. In turn, Utting (2002) investigates two companies, Dole and Nike, 
and points out that they acquired ICMS certification in labor rights despite having very poor labor 
practices in reality. There are also examples of firms that are at the forefront of CSR application, publicly 
support the implementation of such measures and then breach their own codes of conduct (Christian Aid, 
2004 quoted in De La Cuesta Gonzalez & Martinez, 2004). 
 
Empirical evidence, however, demurs this proposition and suggests that the opportunistic 
behavior of companies leads to adverse selection, i.e. poorly performing firms will adopt CSR self-
regulatory measures for gaining benefits such as signaling and legitimacy enhancement without actually 
putting them into effect (Lenox & Nash, 2003). For example, a study conducted by King and Lenox 
(2000) on the Responsible Care Program establishes that the program attracted firms with low 
environmental performance and high emissions. 
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Long and Driscoll (2008) argue that some corporations deliberately adopt CSR self-regulatory 
measures because they enable them to enhance their legitimacy and simultaneously leave intact their 
operations. Similarly, Meyer and Rowan (1977) allege that the informal constraints are not always 
effective and that when they do not go along with the organizational interests, companies will decouple 
self-regulatory practices. 
 
They argue that businesses prefer the adoption of easily decoupled practices because they are 
effective as communication tools of companies’ ethical performance to stakeholders and they do not 
demand the management’s commitment. 
 
 
Stakeholder Theory 
 
Stakeholder theory is one of the most widely used theories by CSR scholars. According to it, 
business must satisfy a number of constituents, including employees, customers, local community 
organizations etc, who can influence company outcomes (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984). It 
maintains that apart from trying to maximize returns for their shareholders, corporations need to take into 
account other non-financial groups because the returns from such behavior may be significant. In 
addition, the theory suggests that by applying a series of CSR policies for satisfying non-financial 
constituencies the firm gains the acceptance and support of these constituencies and thus can continue its 
operations without facing any objections (Ogden & Watson, 1999). 
 
Constituencies who possess legitimacy and power are considered as very important stakeholders 
and for that reason their involvement into formulating firms’ policies is deemed essential. A study 
conducted by Post (2002) suggests that the prominence of each constituency depends on the type of 
demands they put forward. ‘Not every stakeholder wish can be granted, but the legitimate concerns of all 
stakeholders require consideration, and ultimate decisions conflicting with specific stakeholder 
viewpoints need to be explained’ (Post, et al., 2002, p. 245). Evidence from the CSR literature indicates 
that in some cases stakeholders have exerted significant influence on business operations. For instance, 
six European governments require from companies to publish social and environmental information about 
their operations (Vogel, 2005). 
 
Despite of the recognition of stakeholder importance, there are CSR scholars who argue that the 
degree to which companies will take into account non-financial stakeholders depends on stakeholder 
awareness (Christmann & Taylor, 2006). For example, Christmann and Taylor (2006) focus on CSR 
standards like ICMS and use Transaction Cost Theory to evaluate whether the adoption of these standards 
is influenced by stakeholders. The scholars found that most firms behave opportunistically and that their 
propensity to symbolically implement a CSR standard is negatively related to the knowledge of 
stakeholders about management standards. In other words, low awareness may result in only a minimal 
adoption of the CSR standards, just enough to maintain a desirable public image. 
 
Additionally, Elsbach and Sutton (1992) argue that in many cases companies use various 
techniques such as impression management techniques, which can influence stakeholders’ interpretations. 
Firms deliberately refer to organizational design features, which are widely accepted by the institutional 
environment, for increasing the credibility of their actions. The level at which stakeholders are influenced 
by these strategies depends on their awareness on business operations. Similarly, Terlaak (2007) 
maintains that in cases where stakeholders do not have access to sufficient information on business 
operations, firms will use widely promoted CSR self-regulatory tools as symbols of corporate 
responsibility to reassure or even mislead their stakeholders about their operations. 
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Managers use the rhetorical of these practices to gain legitimacy without affecting activities at the 
technical core of the organization (Zbaracki, 1998). Prior evidence has shown that companies will adopt a 
CSR management standard in response to customer requirements and other external pressures rather than 
out of concern for environmental protection or quality assurance (Boiral, 2003b). The goal of these 
managerial practices is to demonstrate to society that companies adhere to its beliefs and expectations. 
The adoption of CSR self-regulatory measures enables companies to achieve that goal since through it 
firms symbolically become isomorphic with other companies and thus more acceptable and 
understandable by their stakeholders (Glynn & Abzug, 2002).  
 
As Bartley (2003) argues certification management standards ‘deal in reputation, which means 
they have the potential effect of ‘greenwashing’ reality, or cleaning up corporate images without changing 
practices on the ground. Stakeholders accept that situation because in reality their awareness about CSR 
tools is in its infancy; though they impel companies to adopt corporate responsible practices at individual 
level, they do not take into account corporate social performance in their decisions (Naeem, 2008). 
Hence, stakeholder’ awareness on CSR standards’ implementation plays a crucial role. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the paper various testable theories have been created keeping in mind the end goal to clarify 
why firms willfully receive CSR instruments, how they embrace them and in what setting. By 
differentiation, the hypothesis keeps up that late adopters tend not to fit in with the prerequisites of the 
practice since they are not intrigued by increasing any operational advantages identified with it. In light of 
this argumentation, that late adopters of ICMS will have a tendency to apply them typically, implying that 
they will not truly endeavor to fit in with their necessities.  
 
As it was explained, firms have a propensity into serving own interests and not complying with 
any self-constraining requirements. According to partner hypothesis, it is to organizations' greatest 
advantage to consider non-money related constituents as by doing as such firms might secure critical 
benefits. It was clarified, nonetheless, that organizations do not generally mull over their partners. By 
complexity, they will do as such just if partners know about firms' exercises and of the effects of these 
exercises. To assess this contention concentrates on partners' impact in transit firms CSR. 
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